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Abstract. Deep neural networks with their large number of parameters are highly
flexible learning systems. The high flexibility in such networks brings with some
serious problems such as overfitting, and regularization is used to address this
problem. A currently popular and effective regularization technique for control-
ling the overfitting is dropout. Often, large data collections required for neural
networks contain sensitive information such as the medical histories of patients,
and the privacy of the training data should be protected. In this paper, we mod-
ify the recently proposed variational dropout technique which provided an el-
egant Bayesian interpretation to dropout, and show that the intrinsic noise in
the variational dropout can be exploited to obtain a degree of differential pri-
vacy. The iterative nature of training neural networks presents a challenge for
privacy-preserving estimation since multiple iterations increase the amount of
noise added. We overcome this by using a relaxed notion of differential privacy,
called concentrated differential privacy, which provides tighter estimates on the
overall privacy loss. We demonstrate the accuracy of our privacy-preserving vari-
ational dropout algorithm on benchmark datasets.
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1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNN) have recently generated significant interest, largely due
to their successes in several important learning applications, including image classifica-
tion, languagemodeling and many more (e.g., [1, 2, 3]). The success of neural networks
is directly related to the availability of large and representative datasets for training.
However, these datasets are often collected from people, such as their tastes and behav-
ior as well as medical health records, and present obvious privacy issues. Their usage
requires methods that provide precise privacy guarantees while meeting the demands of
the applications.
Overfitting is another challenge in deep neural networks, since DNNs can model
complex prediction functions using a large number of parameters. It is often difficult
to optimize these functions due to the potentially large number of local minimas in the
space of parameters, and standard optimization techniques are prone to getting stuck in
a local minimumwhich might be far from the global optimum. A popular regularization
technique to avoid such local minima is dropout [4, 5, 6] which introduces noise into
a model and optimizes loss function under stochastic setting. Recently, it was shown
that variational dropout can be treated as a generalization of Gaussian dropout [7] and
this method can be used to tune each weight’s individual dropout rates [8]. Besides,
2regularization techniques, specifically dropout, may hide details some of the training
data. These features of the dropout method inspire us to use dropout in order to provide
a theoretical guarantee for the privacy protection on neural networks.
We provide a general framework for privacy-preserving variational dropout algo-
rithm by exploiting the inherent randomization of the dropout. Differential privacy (DP)
is currently a widely accepted privacy definition [9, 10] and we use DP to provide a for-
malization to the privacy protection of the proposed algorithm. The main principle of
DP is to ensure that an adversary should not be able to reliably infer whether or not a
particular individual is participating in a database, even with unlimited computational
power and access to every entry except for that particular individual’s data. This can
be accomplished through adding noise into an algorithm at different stages such as
adding noise to data itself or changing the objective function to be optimized. In order
to design efficient differentially private algorithms, one need to design a noise injection
mechanism such that there is a good trade-off between privacy and utility. However,
iterative algorithms such as variational inference accumulate the privacy loss at each
access to the training data, and the number of iterations required to guarantee accurate
posterior estimates causes high cumulative privacy loss. Therefore, our algorithm uses
the zCDP composition analysis [11] that is inspired by concentrated differential pri-
vacy (CDP) [12] which is a recently proposed notion of the differential privacy. CDP is
well suited for iterative algorithms since it provides high probability bounds for cumu-
lative privacy loss and requires adding much less noise for the same expected privacy
guarantee compared to the DP.
In this paper, we study Variational dropout in the case when we tune individual
dropout rates for each weight of neural network to provide measurable privacy guaran-
tee. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
– We first extend the dropout algorithm to protect the privacy of the training data
of DNNs. We use the intrinsic additive noise of the recently proposed variational
dropout algorithm [8], then we explore and analyze that under what conditions
dropout helps in training DNNs within a modest privacy budget.
– In order to use the privacy budget more efficiently over many iterations, our ap-
proach uses the zCDP composition combined with the privacy amplification effect
due to subsampling of data, which significantly decrease the amount of additive
noise for the same expected privacy guarantee compared to the standard DP analy-
sis.
– We empirically show that for general single hidden layer neural network models,
dropout helps to regularize network and improves accuracy while providing (ǫ, δ)-
DP and zCDP. As our experiments illustrate, variational dropout with zCDP out-
performs both the standard DP and the state-of-the-art algorithms, especially when
the privacy budget is low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we survey the related
studies on differentially private deep neural networks and we provide an overview of
the relevant ingredients in Section 3. We formalize our setup, present the differentially
private variational dropout algorithm and provide a theoretical guarantee for differential
privacy on the presented model in Section 4. Section 5 presents our experimental results
on some real datasets. We conclude with some open directions in Section 6.
32 Related Work
Differential privacy has been actively studied in manymachine learning and data mining
problems. Dwork et al. [10] cover much of the earlier theoretical work and Sarwate
et al. [13] review differentially private signal processing and machine learning studies.
Problems that have been studied in the literature range from recommender systems [14],
classification [15] and empirical risk minimization applications [16] such as logistic
regression [17] and Support Vector Machines [18].
There are a number of works that address deep learning under differential privacy.
Recently, Shokri and Shmatikov [19] designed a system that enables multiple parties
to train a neural-network model without sharing their datasets. Their key contribution
is the selective sharing of model parameters during training that is based on perturbing
the gradients of the SGD. Phan et al. [20] proposed a different approach towards dif-
ferentially private deep learning that focuses on learning autoencoders. Privacy relies
on perturbing the objective functions of these autoencoders. Most recently, Papernot et
al. [21] proposed a method where privacy-preserving models are learned locally from
disjoint datasets, and then combined in a privacy-preserving fashion. Our work is most
closely related to the work by Abadi et al. [22]. They developed the moments accoun-
tant method to accumulate the privacy cost that provides a tighter bound for privacy
loss than previous composition methods. Then, by using the moments accountant they
propose a differentially private SGD algorithm to train a neural network by perturbing
the gradients in SGD.
Two distinct types of mechanisms have been proposed for differentially private vari-
ational inference: perturbing the sufficient statistics of an exponential family model [23]
and perturbing the gradients in optimization of variational inference [24]. The second
mechanism [24] uses the moments accountant to perturb the gradients. Our goal is to
apply the concentrated DP [11, 12], which is closely related to the moments accountant,
to gradient perturbation mechanism. We exploit the intrinsic randomized noise of the
variational dropout and derive similar bounds to the moments accountant to strengthen
the privacy guarantee in neural networks.
3 Background
3.1 Differential Privacy
A natural notion of privacy protection prevents inference about specific records by re-
quiring a randomized query response mechanism that yields similar distributions on
responses of similar datasets. Formally, for any two possible input datasets D and D′
with the edit distance or Hamming distance d(D,D′), and any subset of possible re-
sponses R, a randomized algorithmA satisfies (ǫ, δ) differential privacy if:
P (A(D) ∈ R) ≤ eǫP (A(D′) ∈ R) + δ (1)
If D and D′ are the same except one data point, then d(D,D′) = 1. (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy ensures that for all adjacentD, D′, the absolute value of the privacy loss will be
bounded by ǫ with probability at least 1 − δ. Here, ǫ controls the maximum amount of
information gain about an individual’s data given the output of the algorithm.When the
positive parameter ǫ is smaller, the mechanism provides stronger privacy guarantee [9].
4Concentrated Differential Privacy: Concentrated differential privacy (CDP) is a re-
cent variation of differential privacy which is proposed to make privacy-preserving iter-
ative algorithms more practical than DP while still providing strong privacy guarantees.
The CDP framework treats the privacy loss of an outcome,
L
(o)
(A(D)‖A(D′)) = log
P (A(D) = o)
P (A(D′) = o) (2)
as a random variable. Two CDP methods are proposed in the literature. The first one
is (µ, τ )-mCDP [12] where µ is the mean of this privacy loss and the second one is
τ -zCDP which is proposed by Bun and Steinke in [11]. τ -zCDP [11] arises from a
connection between the moment generating function of L(o) and the Rényi divergence
between the distributions of A(D) and A(D′). Most of the DP mechanisms and appli-
cations can be characterized in terms of zCDP, but not in terms of mCDP; so we use
zCDP as a tool for analyzing composition under the (ǫ, δ)-DP privacy definition, for a
fair comparison between CDP and DP analyses.
3.2 Variational Inference
Assume we are given data D = {di}Ni=1 where di = (xi, yi), with input object/feature
xi ∈ RD and output label yi ∈ Y , withY being the output discrete label space. Amodel
characterizes the relationship from x to y with parameters (or weights) θ. Our goal is
to tune the parameters θ of a model p(y|x, θ) that predicts y given x and θ. Bayesian
inference in such a model consists of updating some initial belief over parameters θ
in the form of a prior distribution p(θ), after observing data D, into an updated belief
over these parameters in the form of the posterior distribution p(θ|D). The posterior
distribution of a set of N items is p(θ|D) ∝ p(θ) p(D|θ) where the corresponding data
likelihood is p(D|θ) =∏Ni=1 p(di|θ).
Computing the posterior distribution is often difficult in practice as it requires the
computation of analytically intractable integrals, so we need to use approximation tech-
niques. One of such techniques is Variational Inference [25] that turns the inference
problem into an optimization problem, which is often more easy to tackle and to mon-
itor convergence. In this approach, true posterior p(θ|D) is approximated with a varia-
tional distribution qφ(θ) that has a simpler form than the posterior. The optimal value
of variational parameters φ is obtained through minimizing the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence between qφ(θ) and p(θ|D). This is also equivalent to maximizing the so-
called evidence lower bound (ELBO). Given joint distribution p(D, θ) = p(D|θ) p(θ),
ELBO of qφ is given as follows:
L(qφ) =
∫
qφ(θ) log
(
p(D|θ)
qφ(θ)
)
= −DKL
(
qφ(θ) ‖ p(θ)
)
+ LD(qφ) (3)
LD(qφ) = 〈log p(D|θ)〉qφ(θ) =
∑
(xi,yi)∈D
〈log p(yi|xi, θ)〉qφ(θ) (4)
where 〈·〉qφ(θ) is expectation taken w.r.t qφ(θ) andLD(qφ) is the expected log-likelihood.
5Stochastic Variational Inference An efficient method for minibatch-based optimiza-
tion of the variational lower bound is the Stochastic Variational Inference (SVI) in-
troduced in [26]. The basic trick in SVI is to parameterize the random parameters
θ ∼ qφ(θ) as a differentiable function θ = f(φ, ε) where ε ∼ p(ε) is a random
noise variable. This new parameterization allows us to obtain an unbiased differentiable
minibatch-based Monte Carlo estimator of LD(qφ) and▽φLD(qφ):
LD(qφ) ≃ LSV ID (qφ) =
N
S
S∑
i=1
log p(yi|xi, θ = f(φ, ε)) (5)
▽φLD(qφ) ≃ LSV ID (qφ) =
N
S
S∑
i=1
▽φ log p(yi|xi, θ = f(φ, ε)) (6)
where (xi, yi)Si=1 is a minibatch of data with S random datapoints (xi, yi) ∼ D. The
theory of stochastic approximation tells us that the performance of stochastic gradient
optimization crucially depends on the variance of the gradients [27]. We follow [7]
and use the Local Reparameterization Trick that reduces the variance of this gradient
estimator. The idea is to sample separate weight matrices for each data-point inside
mini-batch by moving the noise from weights to activations [5, 7].
3.3 Variational Dropout
Dropout is one of the most popular regularization techniques for neural networks which
injects multiplicative random noise to the input of each layer during the training proce-
dure. The formalization of dropout is given as:
B = (A⊙ ξ)θ with ξi,j ∼ p(ξi,j) (7)
where A denotes the matrix of input features, θ is the weight matrix for the current
layer, and B denotes the matrix of activations. The ⊙ symbol denotes the elementwise
(Hadamard) product of the input matrix with a matrix of independent noise variables ξ.
The previous publications [4, 6, 28] show that the weight parameters θ are less likely to
overfit to the training data by adding noise to the input during optimization.
At first, Hinton et al. [29] proposed the Binary Dropout where the elements of ξ
are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 1 − p, hence each element of
the input matrix is put to zero with probability p that is also known as dropout rate.
Afterwards, the same authors proposed the Gaussian Dropout using continuous noise
ξi,j ∼ N (1, α = p1−p )with same relative mean and variance works as well or better [6].
It is important to use continuous noise instead of discrete one, because adding Gaussian
noise to the inputs corresponds to putting Gaussian noise on weights.
Then, Kingma et al. [7] proposed Variational Dropout that generalizes Gaussian
dropout [6] with continuous noise as a variational method. It allows to set individual
dropout rates for each neuron or layer and to tune them with a simple gradient descent
based method. The main idea of this procedure is to search for posterior approximation
in a specific family of distributions: q(θi,j |φi,j , α) = N (φi,j , αφ2i,j). That is, putting
6multiplicative Gaussian noise ξi,j ∼ N (1, α) on weight θi,j is equivalent to sampling
θi,j from q(θi,j |φi,j , α). Now θi,j becomes a random variable parameterized by φi,j .
θi,j = φi,jξi,j = φi,j(1 +
√
αεi,j) (8)
θi,j ∼ N (θi,j |φi,j , αφ2i,j) εi,j ∼ N (0, 1)
Variational Dropout uses q(θ|φ, α) as an approximate posterior distribution for a
model with a special prior on the weights. The variational parameters φ and α of
the distribution q(θ|φi,j , α) are tuned via stochastic variational inference as denoted
in Section 3.2. During dropout training, θ is adapted to maximize the expected log-
likelihood (4). For this to be consistent with the optimization of a variational lower
bound, the prior on the weights p(θ) has to be such that DKL
(
q(θ|φ, α) ‖ p(θ)) does
not depend on θ. The prior distribution that meets this requirement is chosen to be the
scale invariant log-uniform prior [7]:
p(log | θi,j |) = const⇔ p(log | θi,j |) ∝ 1/| θi,j | (9)
Then, maximization of the variational lower bound (3) becomes equivalent to max-
imization of the expected log-likelihood with fixed parameter α. It means that Gaussian
Dropout training is exactly equivalent to Variational Dropout with fixed α. However,
Variational Dropout provides a way to train dropout rate α by optimizing the ELBO.
Interestingly, dropout rate α now becomes a variational parameter and not a hyper-
parameter that allows us to train individual dropout rates αi,j for each layer or even
weight [7].
Additive Noise Reparameterization: Although the local reparameterization trick re-
duces the variance of the variance of stochastic gradients, original multiplicative noise
still yields large-variance gradients:
θi,j = φi,j(1 +
√
αi,jεi,j),
∂θi,j
∂φi,j
= 1 +
√
αi,jεi,j , εi,j ∼ N (0, 1)
and very large values of α correspond to local optima from which it is hard to escape.
To avoid such local optima, Kingma et al. [7] only considered the case of α ≤ 1, which
corresponds to a binary dropout rate p ≤ 0.5. However, the case of large αi,j is very
interesting (here we mean separate αi,j per weight or neuron). Having high dropout
rates (αi,j → +∞) corresponds to a binary dropout rate that approaches p = 1. It
effectively means that corresponding weight or a neuron is always ignored and can be
removed from the model. Molchanov et al. [8] introduced a trick that can train the
model within the full range of αi,j ∈ (0,+∞] by reducing the variance of gradients
even further. The idea is to replace the multiplicative noise term 1 +
√
αi,jεi,j with an
exactly equivalent additive noise term ζi,jεi,j where ζ2i,j = αi,jφ
2
i,j is treated as a new
independent variable:
θi,j = φi,j(1 +
√
αi,jεi,j) = φi,j + ζi,jεi,j ,
∂θi,j
∂φi,j
= 1 , εi,j ∼ N (0, 1) (10)
7After this trick, the ELBO is optimized w.r.t. θ and ζ. However, α is still kept and used
throughout the paper, since it has a nice interpretation as a dropout rate and can be
obtained from αi,jφ2i,j = ζ
2
i,j . In addition to reducing the variance of gradients, this
trick also helps us to propose a novel variational dropout algorithm that satisfies the
differential privacy definition by adding independent Gaussian noise to the updates of
each weight.
4 Differentially Private Variational Dropout
In this section, we describe our approach toward differentially private training of neural
networks and introduce the proposed differentially private variational dropout (DPVD)
algorithm. Algorithm 1 outlines our basic method for training a model with parameters
φ by minimizing the ELBO (3). At each iteration of the training scheme, DPVD takes a
minibatch of data, samples the activations using the local reparameterization trick [7],
computes an estimate of the lower bound (3) and its gradient using parametrization
trick (10). This stochastic gradient is then used to update model parameters φ via some
SGD-based optimization method by iteratively applying the following update equation
at iteration t:
φ(t+1) = φ(t) − ηtg˜ (11)
where ηt is the learning rate and g˜ is the gradient of the lower bound g˜ =
(▽θ L(qφ)).
Here, the goal is to estimate θ that equals to φi,j + ζi,jεi,j as given in Section 3.3. The
weights θ are then computed with the following update rule:
θ
(t+1)
i,j = φ
(t)
i,j + ζi,jεi,j − ηtg˜ (12)
The approach presented here regularizes the neural network by adding random noise
ζε. To protect the privacy of training data, the gradients need to be perturbed with
Gaussian noise in each iteration; so we use the existing random noise in order to provide
privacy.
At each step, we have chosen to perturb parameter updates with zero mean mul-
tivariate normal noise with covariance matrix σ2C2I. The algorithm requires several
parameters to determine the privacy budget. Sampling frequency ν for subsampling
within the data set, a total number of iterations T and clipping threshold C are impor-
tant design decisions. Parameter σ in noise level determines our total ǫ and depends on
the total δ in privacy budget and clipping the gradients using the threshold C will lead
L2 sensitivity of gradient sum to be 2C. The amount of noise is chosen to be equal to
the ζε in (12).
In this work, we first calculate the per-iteration privacy budget using the key proper-
ties of advanced composition theorem (Theorem 3.20 of [30]) and this method is called
DPVD-AC in the experiments. Then, we use a relaxed notion of differential privacy,
called zCDP [11] that bounds the moments of the privacy loss random variable and call
this method DPVD-zCDP in the experiments. The moments bound yields a tighter tail
bound, and consequently, it allows for a higher per-iteration budget than standard DP-
methods for a given total privacy budget. The description of how we chose the privacy
design parameters and calculate the privacy budget is given in Section 4.3 [31].
8Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Variational Dropout (DPVD)
1: Inputs: Input data D = {xi, yi}Ni=1, number of data passes T , minibatch size S, learning
rate ηt, noise scale σ, gradient norm bound C.
2: Initialize φ0 randomly
3: for t← 1 to T do
4: Take a random sample St of size S with sampling probability ν = S/N
5: Compute gradient for each (xi, yi) ∈ St: g˜ =
(
▽θ L(qφ)
)
6: Clip gradient: ¯˜g = g˜/max
(
1, ‖ g˜ ‖2/C
)
7: Compute noise: ζε ∼ N (0, 4C2σ2I)
8: Update parameter: θ(t+1) ← φ(t) + ζε− ηt ¯˜g
9: end for
10: Output: θ(T ).
5 Experiments and Results
We evaluate our approach on two standard benchmark datasets. MNIST dataset [32]
contains 70K 28× 28 hand-written digits (60K for training and 10K for testing). DIG-
ITS [33] dataset consists of 1797 8× 8 grayscale images (1439 for training and 360 for
testing) of handwritten digits. We use a simple feed-forward neural network with ReLU
units and softmax of 10 classes for both datasets. All experiments are implemented in
Theano [34].
Baseline: Our baseline models use a single hidden layer with 1000 hidden units. For
MNIST dataset, we use the minibatch of size 600 and reach an accuracy of 97.80%
in about 200 epochs. For DIGITS dataset, we use the minibatch of size 100 and reach
an accuracy of 95.35% in about 100 epochs. All of the results in this section are the
average of 10 runs.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the test accuracies on MNIST for ǫ = {10, 1, 0.1} and the NP case.
Differentially private models: For the differentially private version, we experiment
with the same architecture. To limit sensitivity, we clip the gradient norm of each layer
9at C = 2. We report results for three different noise levels where ǫ = {10, 1, 0.1}.
For any fixed ǫ, δ is varied between 10−2 and 10−5. There is a slight difference with
different δ values (less than 10−3), but still we choose the best performing δ = 10−5
for both datasets. We set the initial learning rate η0 = 0.1 for MNIST and η0 = 0.05
for DIGITS and update it per round as ηt = η0/tγ . We fixed the decay rate γ to 1 for
both of the datasets.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the test accuracies on DIGITS for ǫ = {10, 1, 0.1} and the NP case.
In the first set of experiments, we investigate the influence of privacy loss on accu-
racy. The mini-batch sizes were set to S = 600 and S = 100 for MNIST and DIG-
ITS respectively. We ran the algorithm for 200 passes for MNIST and 100 passes for
DIGITS. Figure 1(a), 2(a) report the performance of the DPVD-AC method and Fig-
ure 1(b), 2(b) report the performance of the DPVD-zCDP method for different noise
levels. These results justify the theoretical claims that lower prediction accuracy is ob-
tained when the privacy protection is increased by decreasing ǫ. One more deduction
from these results is that variational dropout with the zCDP composition can reach an
accuracy very close to the non-private level especially under reasonably strong privacy
guarantees (when ǫ > 0.1).
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Fig. 3. The σ value as a function of ǫ
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Then, we compare the classification accuracy of models learned using two variants
of the variational dropout algorithm: DPVD-AC and DPVD-zCDP. As mentioned in
Section ??, zCDP composition provides a tighter bound on the privacy loss compared to
the advanced composition theorem. Here we compare them using some concrete values.
The noise level can be computed from the overall privacy loss ǫ, the sampling ratio of
each minibatch ν = S/N and the number of epochs E (so the number of iterations is T
= E/ν). For our MNIST and DIGITS experiments, we set ν = 0.01, E = 200 and ν =
0.05, E = 100, respectively. Then, we compute the value of σ. For example, when ǫ =
1, the σ values are 8.24 for DPVD-AC and 2.68 for DPVD-zCDP on MNIST, and the σ
values are 9.73 for DPVD-AC and 2.97 for DPVD-zCDP on DIGITS. We can see from
Figure 3 that we get a much lower noise by using the zCDP for a fixed the privacy loss
ǫ. Therefore, for our neural network models with a total privacy budget fixed to ǫ, the
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Fig. 4. Test accuracy results of DPVD-AC and DPVD-zCDP for ǫ = 0.1.
amount of noise added is smaller for zCDP, and the test accuracy is higher. Figure 4
shows the comparison results of DPVD-AC and DPVD-zCDP methods when ǫ = 0.1
with non-private model. Both results clearly show that using the zCDP composition
further helps in obtaining even more accurate results at a comparable level of privacy.
We compare ourmethods to the most related algorithmproposed by Abadi et al. [22]
and the case when no dropout is used. For the algorithm with no dropout, we use SVI
to update the weights of the neural network. We ran all the methods on MNIST and
DIGITS with varying ǫ. Table 1 reports the test accuracies of all methods. The previous
experiments have already demonstrated that DPVD-zCDP significantly improves the
classification accuracy. These results also support it and show that dropout improves
the prediction accuracy on differentially private neural networks especially when the
privacy budget is low.
Effect of the parameters: The classification accuracy in neural networks depends on
a number of parameters that must be carefully tuned to optimize the performance. For
our differentially private models, these factors include the number of hidden units, the
number of iterations, the gradient clipping threshold, the minibatch size and the noise
level. In the previous section, we compared the effect of different noise levels to the
11
Table 1. Comparison of the methods for ǫ = {10, 1, 0.1}. Bold values indicate the best results.
MNIST DIGITS
ǫ = 10 ǫ = 1 ǫ = 0.1 ǫ = 10 ǫ = 1 ǫ = 0.1
DPVD-AC 0.9462 0.9102 0.8419 0.9361 0.9139 0.8217
DPVD-zCDP 0.9687 0.9327 0.9026 0.9417 0.9278 0.9038
SVI-zCDP (no dropout) 0.9518 0.9126 0.8791 0.9375 0.9107 0.8712
Abadi et al. [22] 0.9701 0.9305 0.8875 0.9450 0.9265 0.8943
classification accuracy. Here, we demonstrate the effects of the remaining parameters.
We control a parameter individually by fixing the rest as constant. For MNIST exper-
iments, we set the parameters as follows: 1000 hidden units, minibatch size of 600,
gradient norm bound of 2, initial learning rate of 0.1, 200 epochs and the privacy bud-
get ǫ to 1. The results are presented in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5. Effect of the model parameters on MNIST dataset.
In standard, non-private neural networks, using more hidden units is often preferable
and increases the prediction accuracy of the trained model. For differentially private
training, using more hidden units leads more noise added at each update due to the
increase in the sensitivity of the gradient. However, increasing the number of hidden
units does not always decrease accuracy since larger networks are more tolerant to
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noise. Figure 5(a) shows that accuracy is very close for a hidden unit number in the
range of [500, 2000] and peaks at 1000.
The number of epochs E (so the number of iterations is T = E/ν) needs to be
sufficient but not too large. The privacy cost in zCDP increases in proportion to
√
T
and it is more tolerable than DP. We tried several values in the range of [50, 400] and
observed that we obtained the best results when E is between 100 and 200 for MNIST.
Tuning the gradient clipping threshold depends on the details of the model. If the
threshold is too small, the clipped gradient may point in a very different direction from
the true gradient. Besides, when we increase the threshold, we add a large amount of
noise to the gradients. Abadi et al. [22] proposed that a good way to choose a value for
C is taking the median of the norms of the unclipped gradients. In our experiments, we
tried C values in the range of [1, 6]. Figure 5(c) shows that our model is tolerable to the
noise up to C = 4, then the accuracy decreases marginally.
Finally, we monitor the effect of the minibatch size. In DP settings, choosing smaller
minibatch size leads running more epochs, however, the added noise has a smaller rela-
tive effect for a largerminibatch. Figure 5(d) shows that relatively larger minibatch sizes
give better results. Empirically, we obtain the best accuracy when S is around 600 (so
the sampling frequency ν = S/N = 0.01). Due to space limitations, we only present
the results on MNIST data, the results on DIGITS data have very similar behavior.
6 Conclusion
We introduced differentially private variational dropout method that outputs privatized
results with accuracy close to the non-private inference results, especially under reason-
ably strong privacy guarantees. To make effective use of the privacy budget over mul-
tiple iterations, we proposed to calculate the cumulative privacy cost by using zCDP.
Then, we showed how to perform variational dropout method in private settings. We
illustrated the effectiveness of our algorithm on several benchmark datasets. One nat-
ural next step is to extend the approach to distributed training of neural networks. The
algorithm proposed in the paper are generic and it can be applied to any neural network
model. We left its application to other variants of neural networks such as convolutional
and recurrent neural networks to future work.
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